This is an indispensable book, thoroughly researched, boldly argued, and written with the clarity, sobriety, and refinement of an aesthete. Daniel Bach is equally adept as storyteller and political investigator or strategy analyst. He charts decades of regionalism in Africa while keeping a perceptive eye on all sorts of foreign influences, and weaves with ease throughout several overlapping and conflicting narratives. Whether he recounts the intersecting histories of colonial politics and postcolonial policies or whether he uncovers the hidden rationales of the various stakeholders, Bach chronicles the hijacking and failure of Africa’s most daring slogan, shedding unpleasant lights on the genesis and the perversion of ideals.

*Célestin Monga, Managing Director, United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO)*

Daniel Bach has long been one of the most original thinkers on Africa’s international relations. This book is particularly timely in exploring sympathetically, yet with a keen analytical perspective, the various strands of African regionalism and how governments are using them to transform their integration in the global economy.

*John Ravenhill, Director, Balsillie School of International Affairs, Waterloo, Canada*

This study combines analytical sophistication with superb empirical knowledge of both the history and contemporary practices of regionalism in Africa. It draws together the many different dimensions of regionalism, from the power of colonial legacies and the ambiguous implications of dense cross-border transactions to the importance of club diplomacy and regime survival. It is the most important study of regionalism in Africa to have appeared in past decade.

*Andrew Hurrell, Montague Burton Professor of International Relations, Oxford University*

Regionalism remains a dominant trend in African international relations even though regional institutions are plagued by severe political and institutional strains. Yet beyond the quest for functional organizations which furnish order, security, and prosperity, there are many other forms of interactions across Africa that analysts and policymakers seldom give serious attention. Daniel Bach’s Regionalism in Africa succinctly captures these two competing dimensions in Africa’s search for cooperative arrangements. The book provides a magisterial account of the travails and triumphs of integration from the colonial period to the present. It is a critical addition to studies of regional integration in Africa and informs comparative analysis of regionalism elsewhere.

*Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations, The University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa*
Regionalism in Africa

Africa, which was not long ago discarded as a hopeless and irrelevant region, has become a new ‘frontier’ for global trade, investment and the conduct of international relations.

This book surveys the socio-economic, intellectual and security-related dimensions of African regionalisms since the turn of the twentieth century. It argues that the continent deserves to be considered as a crucible for conceptualising and contextualising the ongoing influence of colonial policies, the emergence of specific integration and security cultures, the spread of cross-border regionalisation processes at the expense of region building, the interplay between territory, space and trans-state networks, and the intrinsic ambivalence of global frontier narratives. This is emphasised through the identification of distinctive ‘threads’ of regionalism that, by focusing on genealogies, trajectories and ideals, transcend the binary divide between old and new regionalisms. In doing so, the book opens new perspectives not only on Africa in international relations, but also Africa’s own international relations.

This text will be of key interest to students and scholars of African politics, African history, regionalism, comparative regionalism, and more broadly to international political economy, international relations and global and regional governance.

Daniel C. Bach is CNRS Director of Research at the Emile Durkheim Centre for Comparative Policy and Sociology, Sciences Po Bordeaux.
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Daniel C. Bach*
Regionalism in Africa
Genealogies, institutions and trans-state networks

Daniel C. Bach
To Catherine, Emilie and Jérôme
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Not surprisingly, it is to my wife Catherine that this book owes most, not least due to her patient support as a frontline observer and participant in the process that led to this volume. There is little need to say that none of the institutions and people mentioned should be held responsible for its limitations.
### Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACBF</td>
<td>Africa Capacity Building Foundation</td>
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<td>ACHPR</td>
<td>African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights</td>
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>African Caribbean and Pacific</td>
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<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community</td>
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<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>AFTA</td>
<td>Asian Free Trade Agreement (ASEAN)</td>
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<td>AGOA</td>
<td>African Growth and Opportunity Act</td>
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<td>ALBA</td>
<td>Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas</td>
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<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Burundi</td>
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>AMISEC</td>
<td>African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission to Somalia</td>
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<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>AOF</td>
<td>Afrique occidentale française (FWA)</td>
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<td>APEI</td>
<td>Accelerated Economic Integration Program</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>ARF</td>
<td>Asian Regional Forum</td>
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<td>ARIA</td>
<td>Assessing Regional Integration in Africa</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>AIDB</td>
<td>Asia Infrastructure Development Bank</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AU-PSC</td>
<td>AU Peace and Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCEAO</td>
<td>Banque centrale des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest</td>
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<td>BDEAC</td>
<td>Banque de Développement des États de l’Afrique centrale</td>
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<td>BEAC</td>
<td>Banque centrale des États d’Afrique Centrale</td>
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<td>BIT</td>
<td>Bilateral Investment Treaties</td>
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<td>BLS</td>
<td>Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland</td>
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<td>BLSN</td>
<td>Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOT</td>
<td>Build-Operate-Transfer</td>
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</table>
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CA Constitutive Act (of the AU)
CAF Central Africa Federation
CAFTA-DR Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement
CAPC Central African Power Corporation
CAR Central African Republic
CARIFORUM Forum of the Caribbean Group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States
CCJ (ECOWAS) Community Court of Justice
CEAO Communaute Economique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest
CEDEAO Communaute Economique des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (ECOWAS)
CEMAC Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CEN-SAD Community of Sahara-Sahel States
CEPAL Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
CEPGL Communaute Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs
CET Common External Tariff
CEWS Continental Early Warning System
CFA Colonies francaises d’Afrique, then Communaute Financiere Africaine
CILSS Comite permanent inter-Etats de lutte contre la secheresse dans le Sahel
CMEA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon)
CMA Common Monetary Area
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CONSAS Constellation of Southern African States
COPAX Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa
CM Common Market
CPA Cotonou Partnership Agreement
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organisation
CU Customs Union
DFQF Duty Free and Quota Free
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EAAC East African Airways Corporation
EAC East African Community
EACoJ East African Court of Justice
EACSO East African Common Services Organisation
EACU East African Customs Union
EAHC East Africa High Commission
EALA East African Legislative Assembly
EAP East African Posts
EAEC Eurasian Economic Community
Abbreviations

EARC  East African Railways Corporation
EBA   Everything But Arms
EC    European Commission
ECA   Economic Commission for Africa
ECB   European Central Bank
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
ECDPM European Centre for Development Policy Management
ECLA Economic Commission for Latin America
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOSCC Economic, Social and Cultural Council
ECOSOC Economic and Social Committee
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
ECTS Electronic Cargo Tracking System
EEC European Economic Community
EMU European Economic and Monetary Union
EPA Economic Partnership Agreement
EPZs Export Processing Zones
ESA East and Southern Africa group (EPA negotiations)
ESC Economic and Social Committee
EU European Union
EUISS European Institute of Strategic Studies
FCCD Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development
FCD Community and Development Fund
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FEA French Equatorial Africa (or AEF)
FLS Front Line States
FOB Free on Board
FOCAC Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
FOSIDEC Fund for Intervention and Development of the Community
FTA Free Trade Area
FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas
FTAAP Free Trade Area of Asia-Pacific
FWA French West Africa (AOF)
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GSP Generalized System of Preference
GVC Global Value Chain
HCTs High Commission Territories
ICA Infrastructure Consortium for Africa
ICD Infrastructure Country Diagnostic
ICGLR International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICT Information and Communication Technology
IEPA Interim Economic Partnership Agreement
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IGADD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IOC</td>
<td>Indian Ocean Commission</td>
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<td>IRTGI</td>
<td>Improved Road Transport Governance Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISDSC</td>
<td>Inter-State Defence and Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>IUCEA</td>
<td>Inter-University Council of East Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>KOAFEC</td>
<td>Korea-Africa Forum for Economic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least Developed Country</td>
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<td>LLA</td>
<td>Lesotho Liberation Army</td>
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<td>LPA</td>
<td>Lagos Plan of Action</td>
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<td>MAR</td>
<td>Market Access Regulation</td>
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<td>MCPMR</td>
<td>Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution</td>
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<td>MDC</td>
<td>Maputo Development Corridor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Southern Common Market (Mercado Común del Sur)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFN</td>
<td>Most-Favoured Nation</td>
</tr>
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<td>MIP</td>
<td>Minimum Integration Programme</td>
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<td>MLC</td>
<td>Mouvement de libération du Congo</td>
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<td>MMA</td>
<td>Multilateral Monetary Agreement</td>
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<td>MNCs</td>
<td>Multinational Corporations</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NC</td>
<td>Northern Corridor</td>
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<td>NCTTCA</td>
<td>Northern Corridor Transit and Transport Co-ordination Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NITRA</td>
<td>Niger Transit</td>
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<td>NNPC</td>
<td>Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation</td>
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<td>NRA</td>
<td>New Regionalism Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>National Single Window,</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTB</td>
<td>Non-Tariff Barrier</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCAM</td>
<td>Organisation Commune Africaine, Malgache et Mauricienne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCDN</td>
<td>Organisation commune Dahomey-Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODPSC</td>
<td>(SADC) Organ for Defence, Politics and Security Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSBP</td>
<td>One-Stop Border Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSIS</td>
<td>One Stop Inspection Station</td>
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Abbreviations

PAC  Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania
PAP  Pan-African Parliament
PIDA Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa,
PSC  Peace and Security Council
PTA  Preferential Trade Area
RCD  Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie
RDV  Rendez-vous clause (EPA agreements)
REC  Regional Economic Community
RENAMO Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
RMA  Rand Monetary Area
RoO  Rule of Origin
RSA  Republic of South Africa
RTA  Regional Trade Agreement
SACCAR Southern African Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural Research
SACU  Southern African Customs Union
SADC  Southern African Development Community
SADCC  Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SADF  South African Defence Force
SA  South Africa
SAP  Structural Adjustment Policies
SAPP  Southern African Power Pool
SATCC  Southern African Transport and Communications Commission
SCO  Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SDI  Spatial Development Initiative
SEA  (EU) Single European Act
SEM  (EU) Single European Market
SINELAC Société internationale pour l'électricité des Grands lacs
SOCAD Société de commercialisation agricole du Dahomey
SONARA Société nigérienne de commercialisation de l'arachide
SSA  Sub-Saharan Africa
SWS  Single Window System
TC  Telecommunications Corporation
TCC  Trans-Caprivi Corridor
TCR  Regional Cooperation Tax
TDCA (EU-SA) Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement
TICAD Tokyo International Conferences on African Development
TLS  Trade Liberalization Scheme
TRALAC  Trade Law Centre
TVBC Transkei, Venda, Bophutatswana, Ciskei
TPP  Trans-Pacific Partnership
UAM Union africaine et malgache
UAMCE Union Africaine et Malgache de Coopération Economique
UAMD Union Africaine et Malgache de Défense
Abbreviations

UDAO  Union Douanière de l’Afrique Occidentale
UDEAC  Union Douanière et Economique de l’Afrique Centrale
UDEAO  Union Douanière et Economique des États de l’Afrique Occidentale
UEMOA  Union économique et monétaire ouest-Africaine (WAEMU)
UN  United Nations
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP  United Nations Development Program
UNECA  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNIDO  United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
USD  US Dollar
VAT  Value Added Tax
WAEMU  West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA)
WAGP  West African Gas Project
WAMZ  West African Monetary Zone
WBCG  Walvis Bay Corridor Group
WEF  World Economic Forum
WTO  World Trade Organisation
ZANU-PF  Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
1 Introduction

A world of regionalisms

The revival of regionalism in the late 1980s was a global and largely unanticipated phenomenon. The *de facto* crystallisation of trade and investment flows around the three core regions of the ‘triad’ owed much to the dynamism of non-state players. And when states were a driving force, this went along with significant policy-shifts in the mandates and agendas of established regional inter-governmental organisations (Bach, 1999a; Fawcett, 1995).

Waves of regionalism: moment and momentum

The movement known as the first wave of regionalism had surged in the aftermath of the Second World War, shaped by the Cold War and the quest for developmental policy templates in the developing world. The process of European (re)construction, in conjunction with the US Marshall Plan and the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) had reached a decisive step with the adoption of the three Rome Treaties in 1958. The European Economic Community (EEC) and the stated ambition of the ‘fathers’ of Europe to evolve towards a federal state set the tenets for what was presented by the neo-functionalists as a universal and teleological template (Haas, 1961).

In Latin America, the EEC was a particular source of inspiration at a time when US policy remained firmly committed to free trade and multilateralism (Dabène, 2009: 18). The newly appointed Director of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC or CEPAL in Spanish), Raúl Prebisch, had published in 1949 an advocacy of the unification of markets and the planned increase of industrial productivity behind tariff walls (Dabène, 2009: 16–17). The deterioration of commodity prices in the second half of the 1950s had then given a decisive impulse to the elaboration and dissemination of the CEPAL doctrine (*Cepalismo*). *Cepalismo*’s aspiration to combine regional integration with Import-Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) was, by then adopted by a whole generation of new Latin American leaders and bureaucrats. The structuralist approach that was being advocated carried a strong social component, but dissociated itself from the delinking strategies prescribed by the dependency school and experimented,
between 1949 and 1991, by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon).

The resurgence of regionalism (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995; Gamble and Payne, 1996) in the late 1980s followed nearly two decades of growing disillusion towards European construction and integration theory as a whole (Duffy and Feld, 1980; Haas, 1975). The most tangible sign of this revival was the sudden proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements (World Bank, 2005: 28–9) underpinned by trade liberalisation policies (Mansfield and Milner, 1999: 589–627). In Latin America, the days of Celpalismo’s emphasis on ISI behind tariff walls were over. The revitalisation of regionalisation was part of an overall shift towards market-oriented programmes and neo-liberal reforms (Phillips and Prieto, 2010: 116; Malamud and Gardini, 2012: 118). ECLAC was also committed to the idea that integration agreements should not operate ‘as alternatives to a more dynamic role in the international economy, [but] … as processes that complement the effort towards that goal.’ (ECLAC, 1994: 11). Regional integration was expected to promote the emergence of building-blocks for an international economy that would be ‘free of protectionism and barriers to the exchange of goods and services’.

ECLAC explicitly drew its inspiration from the achievements of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum that, since its establishment in 1989, had developed its brand of trade liberalisation. Known as ‘open regionalism’, it involved the extension of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment to both members and non-members of APEC (Ravenhill, 2001: 2). By the early 1990s, APEC included key world economies and was celebrated as one of the world’s most successful regional economic grouping. Its intra-regional trade represented over a third of the global trade of its member-states who also accounted for over 45 per cent of global trade (ibid.).

In contrast with this converging endorsement of neo-liberal and multilateral principles, the goals and visions of the regional institutions involved in the second wave of regionalism were highly diversified. They were also closely articulated with intimations that a ‘world of regions’ (Katzenstein, 2005) or a ‘global world order of strong regions’ (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 20) were emerging within world politics (Acharya, 2007: 629–52).

In North America, it was the lack of progress in multilateral trade negotiations under the Uruguay round that initially prompted, in 1985, the conversion of US trade policy to regionalism. The first RTA, a bilateral agreement signed with Israel in 1985, was followed by negotiations towards the Canada–United States Agreement (CUSA) and, following its enlargement to Mexico, the conclusion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992 (Payne, 1996: 104–7). The agreement was institutionally modest (it merely established a free trade area) but ambitious – it straddled across the north-south divide and went along with the Enterprise for the America Initiative towards a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).

In Europe, it was the Single European Act, initiated in 1986, that resulted in a highly successful (but largely unanticipated) revival of European
construction. Initially triggered by European concern at the rise of Japan, the completion of the Single European Market (SEM) programme was achieved by 1992. By then, the dissolution of the communist bloc in East and Central Europe was conferring a new geopolitical dimension to the project of European construction. In the process, debates on federalism and the constitutionalisation of integration were revived (Weiler, 1998).

Within ASEAN, doubts about the progress of multilateral negotiations within the Uruguay round had triggered fears that the completion of the Single European Market (SEM) might transform the EU, already a powerful trade bloc, into a ‘fortress’. One of the outcomes was the adoption, in 1992, of the Asian Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) towards the establishment of an ASEAN Free Trade Area. This reorientation, however, did not signal any endorsement of the European Union as a model. ASEAN cooperation kept being associated with a unique set of norms and practices (the ‘ASEAN-Way’) that emphasised informality and non-intervention in the internal affairs of member-states (Acharya, 2001: 27–8).

The European model of integration through transfers of sovereignty and ASEAN’s emphasis on non-interference were the expression of two broad prototypes of regionalism: sovereignty pooling and sovereignty enhancement:

APEC and other regional interstate co-operation bodies such as ASEAN, and its ancillaries such as AFTA and the ARF [Asian Regional Forum] in the security domain, are statist and are used to enhance legitimacy. In contrast to the EU, Asian regional organisations are geared to sovereignty enhancement not sovereignty pooling … . Consequently, regionalism becomes a tool for the consolidation of state power.’ (Higgot, 1998: 52–3)

The ASEAN-Way model also challenged the widespread assumption that regional groupings could only prosper in ‘a quintessential liberal-democratic milieu featuring significant economic interdependence and political pluralism’ (Acharya, 2001: 31; Aris, 2009: 452–3).

The second wave of regionalisms was stimulated by the globalisation of the world economy and widely assimilated to the triumph of neo-liberalism and its values. Two decades later, regionalism is associated with new agendas and debates. In Latin America, the lack of clarity of the goals and purposes of ‘new regionalism’ is contrasted with the dynamism of regionalisation as a structural force (Phillips and Prieto, 2010: 118–19). Theories of (new) regionalism, the same authors argue, are less attuned to what regionalisation ‘does look like’, than to ‘what it should look like’ (ibid.: 117). Should one therefore consider that regionalism has already peaked? This is the general question asked by Andrés Malamud and Gian Luca Gardini since the association of comprehensive economic integration with macro-regions has been losing ground to regionalism understood as ‘a set of diverse cooperation projects’ disseminated in several sub-regions (Malamud and Gardini, 2012: 11). The
notion of post-hegemonic regionalism(s) also stresses the loss of centrality of ‘open regionalism’ and ‘US-led neo-liberal governance’ since the 1990s (Riggiorozzi and Tussie, 2012a: 12). Post-hegemonic regionalism also brings attention back to the plurality of models and patterns of cooperation or integration that ‘coexist and overlap’ (Briceño-Ruiz and Ribeiro Hoffmann, 2015: 48). Regionalism has become associated with ambitious transformative regionalist agendas, especially in the case of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA). Created by Hugo Chavez in 2001, ALBA seeks to promote alternatives to existing orders and institutions through non-capitalist practices, alternative development principles based on welfare cooperation and solidarity, civil society participation and direct opposition to neo-liberalism (Riggiorozzi, 2012a: 26–9).

From a global perspective, current evolutions point to an interplay between regionalism and the concept of ‘region’ that has become increasingly diffuse and unmanageable, an issue already foreseen by Andrew Hurrell (1995b: 38) in the hey days of the ‘new’ wave. The regional label, as applied to Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), conventionally refers to arrangements that are apposite to a multilateral agreement. Accordingly, a RTA encompasses free trade or customs arrangements that may be bilateral or quasi multilateral – that is ‘multicounty’ or ‘plurilateral in WTO parlance (Sindzingre, 2014b: 4; World Bank, 2005: 28).

The regional component of the ‘plurilateral’ arrangements is particularly elusive as their span is less than multilateral but more than bilateral or regional (Schwab and Bhatia, 2014: 18). The issue has also gained renewed acuity with current plans towards the formation of ‘mega-regional’ RTAs tying together individual countries situated in different parts of the world. The mega-agreements share little more in common than the inclusion of countries or regions that account for a major share of world trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). These RTAs have earned their mega-regional status because two or more of the parties are in a ‘paramount driver position, or serve as hubs in global value chains’ (GVC), as in the case of the USA, the EU Japan or China (Meléndez-Ortiz, 2014: 13). The RTA’s extensive packages are meant to go well beyond World Trade Organisation (WTO) obligations and cover services, competition policy, investment, technical barriers and regulatory compatibility, intellectual property protection. It is expected that the combination of production-sharing RTAs with regulatory convergence provisions will iron out differences in investment and business climates (Meléndez-Ortiz, 2014: 13).

Another issue, the loss of congruence between regionalism and multilateralism, is at the centre of what Richard Baldwin (2011) describes as twenty-first century regionalism. While the meso-regional organisations of the late 1980s and 1990s were conceived as ‘stepping stones’ towards better integration within the multilateral system, the mega-agreements aspire to become norm-makers against the backstage of a stalled multilateral system. The quasi-multilateral or mega-RTAs are instruments to pursue bloc building
strategies in areas such as intellectual property and investment that were not covered by the Doha round of negotiations.

Unlike ‘new’ regionalism, which was WTO compatible, twenty-first century regionalism is stimulated by the disillusion generated by multilateral trade negotiations. The negotiations have become entangled with geopolitical considerations due to the nature of the players involved, and their ambition to become global norms makers (Draper and Ismail, 2014; Baldwin, 2014; Capling and Ravenhill, 2013: 553–75). Such a dimension was exacerbated when, in November 2014, APEC countries – all of them party to the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations – cautiously agreed to endorse China’s proposal to undertake a feasibility study towards the establishment of another mega-regional agreement, the Free Trade Area of Asia Pacific (FTAAP). The move, described as reluctant, was immediately interpreted in Washington as a US diplomatic success (Mitchell, 2014). Such success was not replicated when, a few months later, another regional project with a global reach, the Asia Infrastructure Development Bank (AIDB) was launched. Like the FTAAP project, it had been initially conceived as a default option, an expression of the impossibility of achieving global multilateralism (Wildau, 2015; Camroux, 2012: 109).

The regionalism–regionalisation nexus

Andrew Axline observed in the late 1970s that even though regionalism kept expanding in the Third World, research in the field was dominated by theoretical language drawn from the European experience (Axline, 1977: 83). Along with the second wave of regionalism, the rise of the new regionalism studies has contributed to give a decisive impulse to the comparative study of regionalisms. The shift away from the more restrictive notion of comparative regional integration has challenged the projection of particular readings of European integration on regionalism (and what it should stand for) in the rest of the world (Söderbaum, 2005: 231; Acharya, 2012: 12).

The substitution of the regionalism/regionalisation dyad to the previous focus on integration/cooperation has been path-breaking in several respects. It is today generally established that regionalism refers to cognitive and/or state-centric projects, while regionalisation points to processes and/or de facto outcomes. The gist of this analytical distinction was already present in Bjorn Hettne’s liminary introduction to the UNU/WIDER ‘new regionalism’ project that subsequently led to the publication of five volumes (Hettne, 1994: 1–11, also 1999: xv–xxix).

We define regionalism as the ideas or ideologies, programmes, policies and goals that seek to transform an identified social space into a regional project (Bach, 2013, 2008c, 1999b). Since regionalism postulates the implementation of a program and the definition of a strategy, it is often associated with institution-building and the conclusion of formal agreements. Regionalism also refers, under the influence of the constructivist literature, to cognitive and
ideational projects associated with the ‘invention’ of regions and construction of identities (Adler, 1997) and delineation of mental maps.

The definition of regionalism as a social phenomenon challenges essentialist conceptions of the region as ‘a limited number of states linked together by a geographic relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence’ (Nye, 1968: vii). Regions, in addition to geography and the flow of goods and people, refer to ‘social and cognitive constructs that are rooted in political practice’ (Katzenstein, 2002: 105). How political actors, state as well as non-state, ‘perceive and interpret the idea of a region’ has become an integral component in the definition and study of (new) regionalisms (Söderbaum, 2011: 54).

Regionalism can account for processes of regional integration through sovereignty pooling, but also for groupings that, as the track-record of ASEAN illustrates, conceive region-building as sovereignty enhancement. For the purpose of drawing cross-regional comparisons, the term is analytically more useful than the more restrictive notion of regional integration:

Integration by definition implies loss of sovereignty, voluntary or through pressure. Regionalism does not. This does not make regionalism less important, as some suggest, but it does call for different concepts and approaches to the study of the phenomena.

(Acharya, 2012: 12)

Unlike the notion of integration, regionalism, can be used to discuss policy-orientations, claims and identities within states. This was precisely the case when, in the 1970s and 1980s, the expression of new regionalism became associated with the idea of an emerging ‘Europe of regions’ (Le Galès, 1998: 265; Keating, 1998).

Regionalisation relates to the build up of interactions that are not necessarily associated with an explicitly asserted or acknowledged regionalist project. Regionalisation is a more encompassing notion than regionalism since it takes into account processes and configurations within which states are frequently not the key players. In addition to the role of diasporas and cross-border trade networks, regionalisation can be associated with the activity of large multinationals, seeking to enhance their competitive edge. More generally, definitions of the dynamics of regionalisation converge towards what was from the onset the rallying ground for all students of the second wave: the study of ‘undirected economic and social interactions between non-state actors, whether individuals, companies or non-governmental organisations …’ (Fawcett and Gandois, 2010: 619; Boás, Marchand and Shaw, 1999). These representations of regionalisation processes were, at least initially, shaped by the experience, turned into a model, of Asia’s network-led integration and open-ended micro-regional processes. In the first case, what was earmarked was the remarkable ability of diasporas to side-step weak regional institutions and strong politico-bureaucratic constraints; while in the second case, it was
the perceptions of what integration entailed that were radically challenged by
the conversion of growth triangles, infrastructure corridors and other spatial
development initiatives into global gateways (Mittelman, 1999; Breslin and
Hook, 2002).

The African maze

A few years ago, two EU scholars, while discussing how to bridge the gap
between EU studies and the ‘new regionalist literatures’, quizzically noted
that ‘Africa poses challenges’ to the political study of regionalisation (Rosamond
and Warleigh-Lack, 2009: 20). This acknowledgement was a significant departure
from the days when the study of regionalism and regionalisation in Africa
would be squarely ignored or declared irrelevant.

Africa may still be considered as a puzzle, but it is no longer a dead angle in
the study of regionalisms and regional integration. The continent is becoming
the crucible for conceptualising and contextualising cross-border regionalisation
processes, the interplay between territory, space and networks, or global
frontier narratives. The new relevance gained by these issues is also a symbol
of the analytical limitations of the theories of regional ‘integration’.

The end of the systematic assimilation of regionalism to regional integra-
tion, the focus on non-state actors, the ideational dimension of regionalisms
and the multiscalar and diverse nature of regionalisation processes cast into the
limelight issues and areas that never caught the eye of regional integration studies.
This is a boost and a bonus for the comparative study of African regionalisms,
a major beneficiary of the combined effects of the dissemination of the con-
tceptual tools used by constructivism (Adler, 1997; Sidaway, 2002; Flynn,
1997), border studies (Baud and van Schendel, 1997; Martínez, 1994; Igué and
Soulé, 1992; Foucher, 1991) and, of course, the new regionalism intellectual
movement (Söderbaum, 2004a; Grant and Söderbaum, 2003; Breslin et al.,
2002; Breslin and Higgit, 2000; Hettne, 1999).

The study of African regionalisms represents a challenge and an incentive
to revisit a number of common assumptions. The notion of ‘waves’ of
regionalism and the narratives associated with these is a first issue that calls
for reassessment. The identification of two waves overlooks the deep and
global imprint left by imperial and quasi-imperial policies associated with
colonial federations in Africa and Latin America, but also the legacies of
China’s tributary system, of Japan’s zone of co-prosperity during the inter-war
period and, in Latin America, of the US Monroe Doctrine.

In Africa, the legacy of colonial amalgamation policies is part of the DNA
of a number of regional groupings and powerfully affects ideational repre-
sentations of federalism and regionalism in general. Conversely, the regional-
ist ideologies that challenged colour discrimination and colonialism (Pan
Africanism, Bolivarianism, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Asianism) contribute to identities,
but also – as in the case of Pan-Africanism – shape the goals and design of
regional organisations.
The analytical implications of such legacies have been frequently overlooked and misunderstood. In Africa, during the 1960s, much of what was interpreted by students of integration as a wave of region-building was actually tied to debates on the deconstruction of policies that had been decided by colonial rulers without consultation of the people of the territories concerned. Regional integration in East Africa was thus celebrated by Joseph Nye in the wake of the accession to independence of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, as unique and unparalleled in Europe (Nye, 1966: 131). In doing so he ignored the gist of the definition of regional integration as a process:

Whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.

(Haas, 1968: 16)

Today, regional ‘integration’ still relates in Africa, to the continuation (and re-legitimisation) of colonial arrangements (the CFA monetary zone and the Southern African Customs Unions) that have been pursued beyond independence, hence our conceptualisation of these in Chapter 2 as cases of integration through ‘hysteresis’.

The discrepancy between the second wave of regionalism and how it actually translated in Africa has been another source of confusion. As demonstrated in this volume, the revival of regionalism in Africa went along with a transformative agenda that was strongly inspired by the EU. The European experience was neither perceived as ‘old’ nor marginalised. As neo-liberal integration gained traction in the Americas, the EU featured instead as an attractive substitute to the then discredited cepalist model in Latin America.

This was somewhat paradoxical at a time when the new regionalism literature, despite its strong Africanist anchor, kept emphasising the need to go beyond the analysis of institutions and claimed to build it legitimacy through disregard for ‘old’ regionalism, associated with outdated integration studies and dysfunctional institutional structures (Shaw, Grant, and Cornelissen, 2011: 5; also their criticism by Acharya and Johnston, 2007a: 10). The EU, in the process, was often cast into the mould of a quintessential expression of ‘old’ regionalism and, as Alex Warleigh neatly put it, ‘the most suitable “other” against which the new regional approach should seek to define itself’ (Warleigh, 2004: 307). The EU and EU studies in general were losing their centrality as a model for other regions, but they remained an integral and active participant in the second wave of regionalism. As noted by Philippe De Lombaerde:

The fact that new regionalism has given us a better and broader understanding of regionalism (i.e. multi-actor, multi-dimensional) does not
necessarily imply that more conventional approaches, based on narrow
definitions have lost their relevance.

(De Lombaerde, 2011: 46)

More generally, the discourse of the New Regionalism Approach (NRA) on
‘newness’ has led to an impasse, due to its deficit on historical contextualisation
(Lorenz-Carl and Remp, 2013: 5) and overemphasis on the binary opposition
between the ‘new’ and the ‘old’. What was once termed by Kate Meagher
an ‘ideology of “newness”’ (Meagher, 2001: 40) has been prone to consider
uncritically the latest wave of regionalism, as if it had ‘overcome, by definition,
the failings of the old’ models (ibid.).

This study of African regionalisms proceeds through the identification of
distinctive threads so as to overcome the analytical trap created by references
to ‘waves’ or to the binary implications of the distinction between ‘old’ and
‘new’. The notion of distinctive threads of regionalism also helps to preserve
the centrality of African agency by focussing on genealogies, institutions and
trans-border networks and spaces.

Five main threads have been identified in relation to what we consider to be
prototypes (or quasi ideal-types) of cross-border interactions: integration
through hysteresis; regionalism as an arena for the conduct of club diplomacy;
the emergence of regional spaces in conjunction with the instrumentalisation
of cross-border disparities underpinned by trans-state networks; region- and
institution-building as expressions of shared pan-African aspirations and cogni-
tive maps; lastly, the dilution of the divide between local, regional and global
integration through defragmentation and innovation.

The conceptual tools used to discuss these categorisations are informed by
the ‘new’ regionalism literature and the revitalisation of African borderland
studies under the impulse of geographers, economists, historians and anthro-
unquestionably the continent where the broadening of the goal posts and
horizons associated with the study of regionalisms has been most notable over
the past two decades. The focus on the regionalism-regionalisation nexus, is
also durably contributing to call attention to issues that ‘put...mainstream
approaches to a serious test’ while highlighting that ‘there are many roads to
regionalism and not all of them lead to new forms of regionalism’ (Börzel,
2012: 263). The world of regions is also a world of regionalisms.
2 Amalgamation and hysteresis

On 26 February 2014, the President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, hosted the centennial anniversary of the Amalgamation of Nigeria in the national stadium of Abuja, an event celebrated as a ‘significant milestone in our journey to nationhood’ (Jonathan, 2014; Maduabuchi, 2014; Ikechukwu, 2014).

Nigeria’s amalgamation, decided in 1914 through administrative fiat, was a casual expression of the obsession of colonial powers with cutting down the cost of managing their respective empires. Federal or quasi-federal entities were established in West Africa (Nigeria, French West Africa federation), Central Africa (French Equatorial Africa federation, Central African Federation) and East Africa (East Africa High Commission). The logics of integration did not necessarily require territorial contiguity, as in the case of inter-territorial cooperation among the four British colonies in West Africa. These politico-administrative arrangements combined elements of centralisation and decentralisation, classically associated with the definition of federal governments (Wheare, 1956: 35), but two key ingredients were missing: federalism was established without any consultation of the communities concerned; the Federations also operated under the authority of metropolitan powers.

The term amalgamation was used by the British to characterise their administrative and financial decision to regroup distinct territories into a single entity. On 1 January 1914, the merger of the Northern and Southern provinces into the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria established a system that was already ‘federal in character’ since it recognised the existence of two autonomous entities, the Northern and Southern Provinces (Ezera, 1964: 20). The birth of Nigeria was at the same time a ‘pure expression of imperialist political will’ (Peel, 1983: 15 and 146), the outcome of a merger that did not endorse any process of convergence rooted in pre-colonial history (Adebanwi and Obadare, 2010). The amalgamation of the two Nigerias, as they were called, followed protracted negotiations between the northern and southern colonial administrations, and a final approval by the House of Commons in London. The name ‘Nigeria’ was then adopted, following a suggestion by Flora Shaw – who later married Nigeria’s first governor, Frederick Lugard.

The people who were being ‘amalgamated’ had never been consulted. As a result, the Premier of the Western region, Obafemi Awolowo, kept declaring